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Welfare Law-1972 SOCIAL SEcuRITY ACT A1ENDMENTS-SUPPLEMEN-
TAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED
Act of October 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603,
§ 301, 86 Stat. 1465
Although the Ninety-Second Congress dealt a fatal blow to Presi-
dent Nixon's much heralded Family Assistance Plan,' it did produce
some meaningful welfare reform.2 Present state-administered programs
of aid to the aged, blind, and disabled will be replaced by a single,
wholly federal welfare program which will become effective January
-1 Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) [hereinafter cited as "1972 Act" or "the Act'].
The Act, as signed by the President, contained no reform with respect to the Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. All that remained was a savings provision
regarding expenditures for social services. Id. § 403, 86 Stat. 1487.
The administration's original bill, the proposed Family Assistance Act of 1970 (H.R.
16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)), would have made far-reaching changes in the existing
welfare structure. It provided for direct federal payments to all needy families with chil-
dren, including the working poor and families with unemployed fathers. Id. § 101. See
generally AramucAN ENTrmP isa INsTITUTE FOR PMLIC PoLicy RE sEARcH, Tm BILL To RE-
VAMP THE WEaRa SYsTE (1970). As Senate Finance Committee Chairman Long explained,
the reforms were killed by the conference committee. 118 CONG. Ric. S 18,488 (daily ed.
Oct. 17, 1972). In effect, the House would not agree to the Senate provisions, nor would
the Senate agree to the House proposals. "[i]t was agreed that the House will send to the
Senate next year [1973] some kind of a bill relating to social security and public welfare
... to offer the Senate the opportunity to propose the sort of things ... that the Senate
thought were vital but which the House felt needed more time for their consideration." Id.
In comparison, aid to the aged, blind, and disabled is politically popular because, for
the most part, the recipients are safely unemployable. See note 94 and accompanying text
infra. Furthermore, these programs are characterized by smaller numbers of people,
smaller budgets, and more nearly static beneficiary roles, and are thus more susceptible
to rapid and efficient reform than the family programs. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 146 (1971) [hereinafter cited as House REPoRT].
2 Although President Nixon was disappointed in the failure of Congress to agree upon
any reform in the family area, he felt that the 1972 Act embodied many of his recommen-
dations to improve programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. CCH Pov. L. REors,
No. 14, at 1 (Nov. 14, 1972). Similarly, Senator Long felt that the Act accomplished real
reform. In response to Senator Ribicoff's suggestion that the failure of Congress to agree
on any reform in the family area set the entire welfare mess back to 1969, Senator Long
replied: "[W]e have done much in this bill. We have done for the aged, blind, and dis-
abled categories, I believe, most of what the Senate wanted to do and I think almost all of
what the House wanted to do." 118 CONG. REc. S 18,488 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972). The
editors of the New York Times disagreed:
Welfare reform is dead. The reform of any program for the betterment of the
human condition is now in danger of falling victim to the reactionary paranoia
that sees all the poor as chiselers or criminals. Waste is to be tolerated only in
defense contracts and to bail out mismanaged corporations. But fear of waste is
enough to veto essential measures for the care of children, the elderly or the poor.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1973, at 28, col. 1.
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1, 1974. 8 This program will have the obvious advantage of uniformity
insofar as it establishes basic minimum criteria which will be in effect
nationwide.4 The states, with certain restrictions, will have the option
of supplementing federal payments.5
The overall effectiveness of this reform should be evaluated in
light of the existing schemes for Old Age Assistance (OAA).6 Three
vital aspects of welfare administration-the federal-state relationship,
the determination of eligibility, and the determination of benefit
levels-merit analysis.
I
OLD AGE AsSISTANCE-PRESENT AND FUTURE
A. The Federal-State Relationship
The current OAA program is a patchwork of state programs sewn
8 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1465. A preliminary description of the program was provided
by the House Ways and Means Committee:
Under the new Federal program, uniform eligibility requirements and uniform
benefit payments would replace the multiplicity of requirements and benefit pay-
ments under the existing State-operated programs. The new program has been
designed with a view toward providing:
1. An income source for the aged, blind, and disabled whose income and
resources are below a specified level;
2. Incentives and opportunities for those able to work or to be rehabilitated
that will enable them to escape from their dependent situations; and
3. An efficient and economical method of providing this assistance.
HousE REPORT 147.
4 With regard to the need for this type of reform, the House Committee reported:
The welfare system in the United States has been moving toward a state of
crisis and chaos-to change its direction will be difficult. The purpose of this bill
is to effect that change. Your committee's bill will establish a new welfare system,
based on a sympathetic understanding of the needs of the helpless, and the con-
viction that all those who are capable of participating in the economy of this
country should have the opportunity and the responsibility of doing so. It is a
system designed to be fair and rational, the kind of system which recipients deserve
and taxpayers can respect.
Id. at 3.
One drawback to the implementation of uniform benefits, however, is that the cost of
living varies from one region to another. This concern prompted Alaska's Senator Gravel
to urge that a study be made to determine the feasibility of factoring cost of living variants
into the benefit formula. 118 CoNo. REG. S 16,948 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1972). His amendment
died in committee.
5 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1474; see notes 19-23 and accompanying text infra.
6 The concentration on OAA is not meant to slight the importance of other programs,
but they are essentially parallel to OAA. The one important area in which they differ is
in the determination of eligibility, which is necessarily far more complex under such pro-
grams as Aid to the Blind (AB) and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).
Further, the OAA program involves more people. In 1968 there were 0.1 million recip-
ients under the AB program, 0.9 million under the APTD program. OAA reached 2.3
million in 1968. PREsmENT's COMM'N ON INCOME MAI rrNANcE PROGRAMS, POVERTY AMID
PLETa : THE AMERICAN PARADOX 115 (1969).
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together by certain basic federal requirements. The scheme is financed
through a system of cost sharing, with the federal government bearing
most of the financial burden of states' programs.7 Although state gov-
ernments are required to participate in the financing of state pro-
grams,8 much of the states' share is borne by local governments.9
Although there are no federal restrictions on the states' freedom to
determine benefit levels, and the states retain primary responsibility
for the day-to-day operation of the program, 10 the federal government
has not given the states free rein in the administration of state pro-
grams. Indeed, "much of the Congressional attention paid to OAA
when the Social Security Act was originally considered in 1935 was
devoted to the federal standards it incorporated and to the methods
chosen by the draftsmen for enforcing them."'"
Federal supervision is accomplished primarily through the require-
ment that the states submit, and the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare approve, a "state plan."' 2 This plan must provide for
7 The federal government pays two-thirds of the costs in 22 states and 60% in most
of the others. Burke, The Need for Welfare Reform, 2 FAMILY L.Q. 353, 357 (1968). Despite
the amount of federal financial participation, state and local governments retain overall
control. Id. An additional drawback to the present cost sharing program is the difficulty
involved in determining exactly how much money the state is entitled to receive. As
Professor Burke points out:
A national welfare system would also eliminate the grant-in-aid system which is
probably the most confusing and complex ever developed. To give one example:
the Federal Government grants to the state, for an old-age recipient, 31/37th of
approximately half of the grant, and then pays anywhere from fifty to sixty percent
of the remaining half the grant ....
Id. at 859.
8 42 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) (1970).
9 In New York, for example, local governments account for 29.1% of the welfare
budget. NATIONAL STUDY SERVICE, STATE VERSUS LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WELFARE:
A MOUNTING IssUE 6 (1968). Local government financial participation has advantages and
disadvantages. Limited fiscal ability and the variation in willingness to support public
welfare among local units of government may have a depressive effect on state programs.
Id. at 8. Arguably, however, local funds in the program may generate local interest. Id. at
10.
10 This freedom has led to the wide disparity of benefit levels throughout the country.
Although some flexibility might be warranted by virtue of the cost of living variations
(see note 4 supra), the variance from state to state is seen as one of the major ills of the
present system. See Musgrave, Heller & Peterson, Cost Effectiveness of Alternative Income
Maintenance Schemes, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 140 (1970).
The present system is a grant-in-aid program. See note 7 supra. The federal govern-
ment merely gives states money with which to administer their programs within the broad
parameters of the Social Security Act. Congress has provided some guidelines, however.
See notes 12-18 and accompanying text infra.
11 R. LEVY, T. LEwIs & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MA'ERIALS ON SOCIAL WE- ARE AND TB-E
INDIVIDUAL 76 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL WELFARE AND THm INDIVIDUAL]. The authors
observe that "Congressional respect for State prerogatives fluctuates cyclically as a func-
tion of a host of political and economic variables." Id. at 77.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
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statewide coverage, state financial participation, and administration of
the program by a single state agency.13 A plan cannot be approved
unless it complies with the requirements of the Social Security Act.14
If a state plan does not comply, the Secretary may attempt to negotiate
compliance. 15 If negotiation fails, the Secretary may initiate a con-
formity hearing.16 Upon a finding of nonconformity, federal grants-in-
aid for the program in question must be discontinued "until the Secre-
tary is satisfied that such prohibited [state] requirement is no longer so
imposed, and that there is no longer any such failure to comply."'17
18 Id. §§ 302(a)(1)-(3). These standards were apparently designed to avoid the "poor
law" attitudes of local government officials and to improve administration. SoCIL. WELEAnE
AND THE INDVIDUAL 84. In 1935, the President's Committee on Economic Security reported:
The administrative provisions in many of the laws are ... defective .... Many
laws place the entire cost of pensions on the local governments, and about one-third
of these acts are optional in the sense that counties may or may not operate under
the pension system as they see fit.
Many of these old-age-pension laws are entirely nonfunctioning; many pension
authorities because of financial pressure have cut benefits below a proper mini-
mum, and there are long waiting lists of needy persons.
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ECON. SECuRmTY, R PORT 26-27 (1935).
The administration of state and local cost sharing can be as complex as the adminis-
tration of federal and state cost sharing. For example, in Town of Vanden Broeck v. Reitz,
53 Wis. 2d 87, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971), the court was faced with a typical problem in local
welfare administration. Mr. Reitz was receiving general assistance from the Town of
Vanden Broeck but he was living elsewhere. The court upheld the town's position that if
Reitz was to continue on the rolls he must return to Vanden Broeck. Despite the court's
assertions (see id. at 93-95, 97-99, 191 N.W.2d at 916-19), this result may be inconsistent
with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See notes 23, 27 & 86 and accompanying
text infra. See generally NATIONAL SrtmY SEavicE, supra note 9.
14 42 U.S.C. § 302 (1970).
15 HEW regulations emphasize the importance of negotiation:
Hearings with respect to [conformity] matters ... are generally not called,
however, until after reasonable effort has been made by the [Social and Rehabilita-
tion] Service to resolve the questions involved by conference and discussion with
State officials. Formal notification of the date and place of hearing does not fore-
close further negotiations with State officials.
45 C.F.R. § 201.6(c) (1972).
16 The procedures for conformity hearings are set forth in id. §§ 213.11-.29 (1972). The
hearing is a quasi-judicial proceeding held to determine whether or not the state is in
compliance with the federal standards. Parties may appeal an adverse ruling to the Court
of Appeals. Id. § 201.7. Individual recipients, as well as welfare rights groups, are permitted
to intervene in these hearings. See Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d
456 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
17 42 U.S.C. § 304 (1970). Prior to termination, the Secretary must accord reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard and find
(1) that the [state] plan has been so changed as to impose any age, residence, or
citizenship requirement prohibited by section 302(b) of this title, or that in the
administration of the plan any such prohibited requirement is imposed, with the
knowledge of such State agency, in a substantial number of cases; or
(2) that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to comply substantially
[Vol. 58:803
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Despite these federal conformity requirements, however, the states
retain a great deal of flexibility in determining need and* benefit
levels.18
The new federal program is to be administered in accordance with
uniform rules and regulations; however, a state may enter into an
agreement with HEW whereby HEW will administer a state-financed
supplementary program to augment federal benefits. 19 This supple-
with any provision required by section 302(a) of this title to be included in the
plan ....
Id.
Until 1968, the Secretary was required to discontinue federal funding for all categorical
aid programs upon a finding of nonconformity. At this time, however, the Secretary in his
discretion may withhold payments within the offending parts of the program. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 201.6(e) (1972).
Recipients' suits, either singly or in a class action, are another important method of
enforcing the federal standard against nonconforming states. For an individual, the con-
formity hearing is not a very desirable approach since it affords no individual relief and
has little precedential value. Consequently, recipients frequently seek relief in the courts.
If the plaintiff opts for federal court, he will be faced with a significant jurisdictional prob-
lem. If he has a colorable constitutional argument, he can get into federal court on the
basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). An attendant statutory claim could then be decided by
pendant jurisdiction. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Both the statutory and con-
stitutional claims must be derived from a common nucleus of law and fact as required
by United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In attempting to establish jurisdic-
tion under § 1343(3), however, the constitutional argument cannot be frivolous. See Russo
v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971).
An argument can be made that a federal court should grant jurisdiction under
§ 1343(4) solely on the basis of a statutory claim. The theory is that § 1343(4) provides for
jurisdiction in the district court of any Act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that anyone who is deprived of a right or
privilege secured him by the constitution and federal laws has a cause of action. Authority
is split on the legitimacy of this argument. Compare McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1969), with Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969),
and Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
18 The determination of need, that is, who does or does not have sufficient income, is
very difficult. The usual starting point for that determination is the Social Security Ad-
ministration's "poverty line," but that is not a very realistic figure. See notes 75 & 76 infra.
To compound the problem, most states are unable to meet even this figure. ADvisoRy
COUNCIL ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, REPORT, S. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 18' (1960).
Consequently, benefit levels-what the applicant will actually receive-are far from
adequate.
19 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1474. A state entering such an agreement will benefit from
the Act's "hold harmless" clause which provides:
The amount payable to the Secretary by a State for any fiscal year pursuant to
its agreement or agreements under section 1616 of the Social Security Act shall
not exceed the non-Federal share of expenditures as aid or assistance for quarters
in the calendar year 1972 ....
Id. § 401(a)(1), 86 Stat. 1485. As former HEW Secretary Richardson explained in a state-
ment before the Senate Finance Committee, the hold harmless clause protects the states
from increased financial burden due to the application of more liberal eligibility require-
ments under the new federal standards. If the states choose to raise their benefit levels,
1973]
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mentary program must include those individuals eligible under the
federal scheme,20 but, if it so chooses, a state may employ a higher
income/resource disregard 21 in its supplementary program, thereby
bringing more applicants within its program than would the federal
plan.22 In order to discourage "benefit shopping," the Act allows the
states which adopt supplemental benefit plans to impose a durational
residency requirement.
23
The establishment of a national system is without question the
most significant aspect of the program. OAA is presently administered
under fifty-four different programs with varying need and income
formulations.24 By providing for guaranteed minimum benefits, admin-
however, they would have to shoulder that burden themselves. Hearings on the Social
Security Amendments of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
117 (1971) (testimony of E. Richardson, Secretary, HEW).
The Ways and Means Committee noted:
]here may be a continuing need for State supplementation of the new Federal
assistance programs.... [Ift would appear generally desirable that such supple-
mentation be provided through the same agencies which would be established to
operate the federal programs. This would avoid unnecessary duplication of ad-
ministrative costs, would permit the States to take advantage of the improved
methods and procedures which the bill would require, and would tend to foster
national uniformity in the operation of assistance programs.
HousE REPORT 199.
20 See 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1474.
21 In determining need, a state may wish to exclude certain income and resources.
This is primarily used as a work incentive. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
Obviously, the application of a higher exclusion will have the effect of bringing more
people within the program since applicants with correspondingly higher incomes become
eligible.
22 The Act provides:
Any State (or political subdivision), in determining the eligibility of any indi-
vidual for supplementary payments described in subsection (a), may disregard
amounts of earned and unearned income in addition to other amounts which it is
required or permitted to disregard under this section in determining such eligibil-
ity, and shall include a provision specifying the amount of any such income that
will be disregarded, if any.
1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1475.
States are further encouraged to furnish services to help recipients attain or retain
capability for self-support or self-care. This program is a grant-in-aid program similar to
the existing OAA scheme. See id. § 302, 86 Stat. 1478-84.
23 Any State (or political subdivision) making supplementary payments described
in subsection (a) may at its option impose as a condition of eligibility for such
payments, and include in the State's agreement with the Secretary under such sub-
section, a residence requirement which excludes individuals who have resided in
the State (or political subdivision) for less than a minimum period prior to appli-
cation for such payments.
Id. § 301, 86 Stat. 1474. A state which chose to use such a requirement, however,
might find itself open to attack on the basis of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
See note 13 supra and notes 27 & 86 and accompanying text infra.
24 See HousE REPoRT 150. Naturally, a wide disparity in benefits results from this
multiplicity of programs. For example, in April 1968, OAA payments ranged from $50 in
.[Vol. 58:803
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istered uniformly, while permitting the states the freedom to sup-
plement federal benefits, the new plan represents a significant
improvement.25
B. Determination of Eligibility
In the context of the present OAA system, the principal eligibility
requirements are age26 and maximum income standards. States parti-
cipating in the OAA program must provide benefits to applicants who
are otherwise eligible, that is, those who can meet the state's need
definition, and who are over sixty-five. A state may, if it chooses,
provide benefits to younger applicants, but if it does so, it cannot
expect federal aid for those individuals.27 The states are able to
Mississippi to $182 in Nebraska. AmRxcAN ENTERPRIsE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RE-
sARxcie, supra note 1, at 46.
25 In addition to the obvious advantage of uniformity, the quality of administration
may improve since the new program will be administered by the Social Security Adminis-
tration. House REPoRT 157. This should obviate the highly variable quality of state ad-
ministration, even though many of the same employees will be involved. See Hearings,
supra note 19, at 120-21 (testimony of E. Richardson, Secretary, HEW).
26 42 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1970):
For the purposes of this subchapter, the term "old-age assistance" means
money payments to, or . . . medical care in behalf of or any type of remedial
care recognized under State law in behalf of, needy individuals who are 65 years
of age or older ....
27 This is consistent with the policy that the federal definitions describe the mini-
mum OAA population. A state may not deny aid to those within this population. A state
may take it upon itself to expand this population, but currently,
only Colorado makes noncontributory pensions available to needy persons at an
earlier age; a Coloradan may obtain (wholly state financed) benefits at 60 if he has
been a resident of the state for 35 years immediately preceding his application
for aid.
SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 88. California has taken a middle road, providing
for benefits at 65, but stating that if the federal government should "make available to
this state grants-in-aid to persons who have attained the age of 60 years" then it would
also drop the age requirement to 60. CAL. WELT. & INSr'NS CODE § 12050 (West 1972).
The Act also contains an institutional inmate exclusion, which states that "the term
'old age assistance' . . . does not include any such payments to or care in behalf of any
individual who is an inmate of a public institution (except as a patient in a medical in-
stitution)." 42 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1970). The justification for this exclusion is clear:
[Sjince public institution inmates are cared for at public expense, they have no
need for an additional (at least federally financed) stipend; the categorical assis-
tance programs were designed to promote "outdoor assistance," not to encourage
state and local governments to expand their institutional populations.
SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIvIDUAL 1335. Although inmates of public institutions may
fall within this rationale, a question arises concerning applicants who are residents of
private institutions. Presumably the state could not exclude such individuals from its
OAA population if maximum weight were accorded to the "all eligible individuals" ration-
ale. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text infra. See also note 88 and accompanying text
infra (discussing viability of argument that institutional inmates were non-needy).
Other standards originally included in the Act have become obsolete through the
1973)
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determine the need level for OAA applicants and may exclude any
applicant whose income and resources exceed this level.28
The extent to which states may develop other eligibility criteria is
somewhat unclear. The Social Security Act presently requires that aid
be furnished to "all eligible individuals."2 9 In the AFDC context,
this phrase has recently been construed to mean that the state must
furnish aid to all persons who are not specifically excluded by the
statute.80 In the OAA section of the Act, however, this phrase is
followed by qualifying language which may give the state flexibility.31
If such qualifying language is not so construed, states must be bound
by the strictures of the Act.82
In addition to the age criterion of sixty-five,3 3 the new plan con-
tains a uniform "needs test," which requires applicants to have,
judicial process. A citizenship standard was struck down in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971), where the Court held that a state cannot condition welfare benefits upon
the applicant's possession of American citizenship. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), the Supreme Court approached the problem of a congressionally authorized resi-
dence standard, and held that the imposition of a one-year waiting period violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
28 See notes 40-42 and accompanying text infra.
29 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(8) (1970).
80 In Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), the Court was faced with a challenge
to a provision in the Illinois AFDC program which terminated benefits to college students
but not to those in trade schools. The Court found this provision to be inconsistent with
the "all eligible individuals" clause. This interpretation of the statute greatly limits the
states' discretion to determine eligibility for AFDC, for it in effect says that everyone is
eligible who is not excluded by the federal definitions.
11 Section 302(a)(10)(B) provides that a state may "include reasonable standards, con-
sistent with the objectives of this subchapter, for determining eligibility for and the extent
of such assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(10)(B) (1970). In light of the principle embodied in
Townsend, however, this section might be interpreted to mean that the state may expand
upon the basic federal definitions of eligibility, but that it may not cut into the federally
protected OAA population. See note 27 supra. By 1974, however, this question will become
academic, since uniform eligibility criteria will be in effect. See note 3 and accompanying
text supra.
32 The Act excludes very few needy applicants. It contains an age requirement of 65
years (42 U.S.C. § 302(b)(1) (1970)) and an institutional inmate exclusion. Id. § 306(a). Thus,
anyone over 65 who is not subject to the institutional inmate exception must be eligible
if the Townsend rationale applies. This is not to say that the applicant will receive any
benefits, however, since the state remains free to establish need and benefit levels. It does
mean that the application must be considered, processed, and run through the need/bene-
fit formula. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text infra.
83 Although 65 is the usual retirement age, it is not necessarily the most appropriate
eligibility threshold. For example, the Social Security Act now provides that individuals
may opt into the Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance program [social security]
at age 62, as long as all other eligibility criteria are fulfilled. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (1970).
The establishment of an age standard is primarily a sociological problem, not a legal one,
and i beyond the scope of this Note.
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subject to certain exclusions,3 4 personal incomes of less than $1,560 per
year and resources of less than $1,500 in order to qualify. 5 In addition,
there are special limits on gross income from a trade or business
30
and a limitation on the eligibility of certain individuals-specifically,
those who are outside of the United States3 7 and those who, throughout
any month, have been in a "hospital, extended care facility, nursing
home, or intermediate care facility."38 Alcoholics and addicts are
covered by the Act, but only if they are undergoing "treatment that
may be appropriate for [their] condition... at an institution or facility
approved . . . by the Secretary" and can demonstrate that they are
"complying with the terms, conditions, and requirements of such
treatment."89
84 See note 67 infra.
35 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1466. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text infra.
36 The Secretary may prescribe the circumstances under which, consistently with
the purposes of this title, the gross income from a trade or business (including
farming) will be considered sufficiently large to make an individual ineligible for
benefits under this title. For purposes of this subsection, the term "gross income"
has the same meaning as when used in chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.
Id., 86 Stat. 1466-67.
37 Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no individual shall be con-
sidered an eligible individual for purposes of this title for any month during all
of which such individual is outside the United States .... [A]fter an individual
has been outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days, he shall
be treated as remaining outside the United States until he has been in the United
States for a period of 30 consecutive days.
Id., 86 Stat. 1468.
38 Id., 86 Stat. 1467. Those individuals are eligible for a maximum benefit of $25 per
month. See id. The apparent rationale for this provision is that "[f]or [those] people most
subsistance needs are met by the institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
ment to [those] people, though, would be needed to enable them to purchase small comfort
items not supplied by the institution." Housa REPORT 150; see notes 87-88 and accompany-
ing text infra.
39 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1467. The statute is not clear as to whether aged individ-
uals are included in this provision. It provides that "no person who is an aged, blind, or
disabled individual solely by reason of disability" caused by alcoholism or addiction may
be eligible unless he submits to treatment. Id. Arguably this requirement should be
read to cover those who are obtaining benefits solely on the basis of disability caused by
alcoholism or addiction. The aged and the blind should be entitled to benefits by virtue
of the fact that they are aged or blind. Apparently the Ways and Means Committee was
of this opinion since they reported
that those who are disabled, in whole or in part, as a result of the use of
drugs or alcohol should not be entitled to benefits under this program unless they
undergo appropriate, available treatment in an approved facility, and the bill so
provides. Your committee, while recognizing that the use of drugs or alcohol may
indeed cause disabling conditions, believes that when the condition is susceptible
to treatment, appropriate treatment at Government expense is an essential part of
the rehabilitation process of people so disabled.
House REPORT 149 (emphasis added). Insofar as it applies to the disabled, this requirement
19731
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C. Determination of Benefit Levels
States currently have almost complete freedom in establishing
need and benefit levels.40 Ordinarily, the state establishes what it
believes to be an adequate need standard in an effort to define its
needy population. In determining benefit levels, any existing income is
subtracted from this figure to yield a "net need." 41 If, after this
computation the applicant remains "needy," the benefit is computed.
Theoretically, the benefit should equal the net need; however, since
most states have inadequate resources, the benefit level is usually far
below this figure.
42
Crucial to the determination of benefit levels is the precise
meaning of "income." The Social Security Act requires that a state
must "take into consideration any other income and resource" of an
OAA applicant.48 This requirement has led to some unexpected results.
For example, an increase in benefits in one program must be con-
sidered as "income" with respect to the recipient's eligibility for
another. Consequently, an increase in social security benefits, for
example, would lower an OAA recipient's benefits and possibly destroy
seems eminently reasonable in light of the current levels of drug addiction and alcoholism
throughout the country.
40 The present Act does contain a provision with respect to AFDC which requires a
cost of living adjustment of the need figure. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970). This was recently
construed to require the states to re-evaluate the component factors that comprise their
need equation. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Furthermore, under Rosado, a
state may no longer create a maximum limit on family benefits; states which have a
maximum must adjust it to comport with cost of living increases. Id. See generally Rabin,
Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients: A Case Study in
Welfare Administration, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1143 (1970). There is no parallel requirement
with respect to OAA.
41 See Cox v. State Social Welfare Bd., 193 Cal. App. 2d 708, 713, 14 Cal. Rptr. 776,
779 (1961).
42 Less than half the states fully meet need by their own standards. AuvisoRy CouNcIL
oN PUBLIc AssISrANcE, supra note 18, at 18. A state may impose maximums on the amount
any individual or family may receive. Id. Another approach is to pay a percentage of the
need figure. Id. The constitutionality of a Maryland regulation which establishes a maxi-
mum grant per family was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Although the Maryland statute had the effect of discriminating
against large families, the maximum was held to be defensible as long as every eligible
individual received some benefit. The Court reasoned:
Given Maryland's finite resources, its choice is either to support some families ade-
quately and others less adequately, or not to give sufficient support to any family.
We see nothing in the federal statute that forbids a State to balance the stresses
that uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all families against the
greater ability of large families-because of the inherent economies of scale-to
accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments.
Id. at 479-80.
43 4 U.S.C. § 302(a)(10) (1970).
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his eligibility for collateral programs such as public housing or food
stamps.44 Unfortunately, the new plan provides only a twenty dollar per
month disregard as protection from this illogical result.45
One of the most difficult problems states presently encounter is
in valuing the applicant's home as a resource. Consequently, there is a
wide variance from state to state in the treatment of a home.4 In
some states, for example, an applicant may be declared ineligible
if he owns a home worth more than a specified maximum.47 In other
states the applicant's home will be considered as one factor in deter-
mining his need.48 A third group of states simply ignores the value
of the home.49
44 The problem is not merely a theoretical one. Some 187,000 elderly recipients suf-
fered an overall reduction in benefits when a recent 20% increase in social security pay-
ments went into effect. See Shipler, Social Security Rise Becomes a Nightmare for Many
Elderly, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 7. This article was one of several used by Sen-
ator Mondale to support his "pass-through" amendment which was designed to avoid this
result. See 118 CONG. RFc. S 16,929-36 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1972).
45 See note 67 infra. Eligibility for Medicaid was preserved (see 1972 Act § 249E, 86
Stat. 1429), but the Mondale amendment, although passed by the Senate, was deleted by
the conference committee. Senator Mondale voted for the 1972 Act, but not without protest:
I cannot believe that any of my colleagues really intended when they voted
for the 20-percent increase to reduce the benefits available to old people, who have
already suffered inordinately from the inflation which has gripped our Nation for
several years now.
.I only hope that the Congress will turn its energies as quickly as possible to
rectifying the injustice it has done.
118 CONG. REc. S 18,499 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972).
46 All states have established exclusions of one sort or another for ownership of
homes or realty by applicants and recipients. About half the states place a maxi-
mum value on homestead ownership, ranging from $2500 to $12,000. Other states
exclude homesteads completely and establish varying dollar maxima for real estate
of other kinds.
SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 108.
47 See 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1300.60-.76 (1972).
48 Id.
49 SocuAL WELFAE AND T'E INDIVIDUAL 108. This diversity in treatment is due in part
to the federal government's failure to define "resource" with the same precision as "in-
come." Furthermore, the federal regulations say almost nothing about need determination.
The federal regulations are also silent on the question of whether in considering the
value of an applicant's home the state should consider the market or equity value. For
example, a question arises as to what value should be attributed to an applicant's resource
determination when he owns a $40,000 home but has a mortgage of $30,000 outstanding.
The Arizona Attorney General held that the term "fair market value" of an applicant's
property as used in various Arizona welfare eligibility provisions means the equity value,
or the value of the owner's interest in the property after deducting the amount of the out-
standing unpaid mortgage, lien, encumbrance, or security interest. A=a. Arr'Y GEN. Op.
No. 69-25, at R-98 (1969).
In Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 405 -U.S. 970
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Under the new program, the applicant's home (including the land
that appertains thereto) is excluded from the benefit calculation-at
least to the extent that its value does not exceed such amount as the
Secretary deems reasonable. 50 Although this uniform approach may
ease some administrative burdens, a more equitable system would not
automatically deny eligibility to an applicant owning a home valued
above a set amount, but would consider the home as a resource and
factor its value through the needs formula.51
The state might, under the existing OAA program, provide for
the recoupment of welfare grants through the implementation of a
relatives' responsibility statute.52 This could have the effect of forc-
ing an applicant to live in the home of a relative who is in a position
to provide assistance. 3 When the applicant is actually living with
(1972), the federal district court held that a Pennsylvania regulation which provided that
certain welfare recipients would have to repay assistance and execute a lien on their real
property to the state to secure the repayment obligation violated neither the Constitution
nor the Social Security Act. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afJ'd mem.,
393 U.S. 323 (1969), held constitutional three types of repayment obligations: liens on in-
terests in real property; liens upon actual and potential recoveries for personal injuries;
assignments of the interests of an insured recipient in life insurance policies.
50 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1470.
51 A denial of eligibility is a harsh policy since the potential applicant does not have
any opportunity to establish need. Allowing the homeowner to apply for benefits despite
the value of his house would avoid the problem of setting an arbitrary limit. The need
equation should filter out those whose equity value is so great as to render the applicant
non-needy. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
52 [These] statutes ... originated in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. The poor
law was not just a law about the poor but a law of the poor. It was an accumula-
tion of the legal provisions which monitored and guided all facets of the lives of
that particular class of people. The provisions were special and are distinguishable
from the common law under which all others in England lived. They were designed
not to solve the causes and problems of destitution but to minimize the cost to
the public of maintaining the destitute. The blood relationship was one of the
means used to find resources, other than public, for the support of the poor.
4 ST. MARv's LJ. 240, 242 (1972) (footnotes omitted). Prior to 1601 there was no common
law duty to support indigent parents. Tully, Family Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and
Unconstitutional Imposition, 5 FAwILY L.Q. 32, 38 (1971).
There are 33 states with relatives' responsibility statutes. Id. at 32 n.2. The various
statutes differ greatly with respect to which relative may be liable, the circumstances under
which the relative is liable, and the scope of the relative's liability. SOCIAL WrLFAI AND
Tim INDrvIDuAL 125. In some states, for example, the statutes impose a support obligation
on siblings and grandchildren as well as the spouse and children. Compare ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 23 § 3-1.2 (Smith Hurd 1967) with IowA STAT. ANN. § 249.6 (1969). See generally Man-
delker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws, 54 MIcH. L. Rlv. 497 (1956).
Relatives' responsibility statutes are not viewed favorably by the federal authorities
who have urged that the states eliminate such liability. Furthermore, these statutes may
be unconstitutional. See Neiman, Legal Problems of the Aged Poor, 26 LEGAL AID Bprw-
CAs 13, 15 (1967). But see 4 ST. MAny's L.J. 240 (1972).
53 Relatives' responsibility statutes are defended on two grounds. First, they supposedly
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another person, states presumably must attempt to ascertain the fair
value of that accommodation.5 4 The new program provides that when
the applicant is living with another person, regardless of the type of
accommodations, his benefits must be reduced by one-third.55 This
provision avoids the practical difficulties encountered in determining
the value of room and board but has the disadvantage of accompany-
ing rigidity. 6
Another problem in the existing scheme which is considered by
the new plan is the treatment of the spouse's income and resources.
The complexity of the present scheme is illustrated in Cox v. State
Social Welfare Board,57 in which the court had to determine whether
or not the Board was required to consider the applicant's wife's eligibil-
ity for social security as a resource. The court held that federal regula-
tions required that the wife's income be considered if she were an "es-
sential person,"5s although it noted that the state could apply its own
definition of "essential person"-at least until a federal definition was
formulated.5 9 The new plan, on the other hand, provides that "income
serve to protect the state treasury. Second, they are designed to strengthen the family unit.
Tully, supra note 52, at 39-44. However, they may well lead to serious psychological prob-
lems for both the applicant and the responsible relative. Id. at 39-43. Furthermore, they
tend to perpetuate poverty by thrusting a support obligation upon those just emerging
from poverty themselves. Id. at 42-43.
54 It is not clear whether the states have to consider the receipt of food and shelter
as "income and resources." Certainly, the state has the power to take this into account in
determining income and resources without running afoul of the Social Security Act. Con-
tributions from relatives must be considered as income, however. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4)
(1972). Although there are no cases in point, it certainly seems logical to require the states
to consider the actual receipt of such benefits in determining benefit levels.
55 1972 Act § 801, 86 Stat. 1468-69.
56 An interesting problem is presented when the applicant voluntarily becomes im-
poverished. In Bertch v. Social Welfare Dep't, 45 Cal. 2d 524, 289 P.2d 485, (1955), for ex-
ample, the applicants transferred all of their worldly possessions to a religious society
from which they received food and shelter. The applicants stipulated that they would turn
over any OAA benefits received to the society. The court held that the finding that the
applicants' need was based upon voluntary acceptance of a lower standard of living was
immaterial to the need determination. Presumably, however, benefits could be reduced by
the value of the benefits actually received from the society.
Under the new Act, the benefits received by the plaintiffs in Bertch would be auto-
matically reduced by one-third. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
57 193 Cal. App. 2d 708, 14 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1961).
58 Id. at 716, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81.
59 The court said: "[S]o long as [the applicant] obtains increased benefits as a result
of his obligations toward his wife she must realistically be an 'essential person' within the
meaning of the federal regulation." Id. at 715, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 780. Should a subsequent
federal definition of "essential person" be promulgated which conflicts with the California
rule, the federal definition would prevail under conformity and supremacy principles. A
state which continued to utilize its own, more restrictive definition of "essential person"
19731
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and resources shall be deemed to include any income and resource of
[a] spouse, whether or not available to [the applicant]."60 This presump-
tion applies not only to a legal spouse under state law but also to in-
dividuals who "are found to be holding themselves out to the
community in which they reside as husband and wife."0' 1 The breadth
of this provision may be subject to constitutional attack.62
Under the present OAA system, in addition to items which must
be counted as "income and resources," certain other items may be dis-
regarded in determining net need. The states may disregard up. to
$7.50 of any income and $20 of earned income per month.0 a Earfed
income between $20 and $80 would reduce benefits at the rate of
fifty cents for every dollar earned.64 Any unearned income over $7.50
and any earned income over $80 will reduce benefits dollar for dollar.
The new plan establishes an income limitation of $1,560 per
year0 5 and a resource ceiling of $1,500.6 In determining these figures,
however, the Act provides for a significant income and resource dis-
regard,67 although it maintains the distinctions between earned income
would be liable under the "all eligible individuals" clause. See Townsend v. Swank, 404
US. 282 (1971).
60 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1473.
61 Id. This requirement is important since it precludes a couple from terminating
their formal marital relationship solely to obtain the increased benefits which would
accrue to them as individuals.
62 See note 90 and accompanying text infra.
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a)(10)(A)(i), (ii) (1970).
64 Id. § 302(a)(10)(A)(ii). The section provides that "of the first $80 per month of
additional income which is earned the State agency may disregard not more than the first
$20 thereof plus one half of the remainder." Id.
65 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1466. For couples this figure becomes $2,840. Id.
66 Id. For couples this figure becomes $2,250. Id.
67 The income disregard is $20 a month for social security or other income and an
additional disregard of $65 of earned income plus one-half of any earnings above $65.
Id., 86 Stat. 1469-70. This is essentially a work incentive program. See notes 91-94 and
accompanying text infra. State payments under an optional state plan are also excluded.
1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1470. This is consistent with the desire to encourage states to
supplement the federal program.
In determining the value of an applicant's resources, the applicant's home, household
goods, personal effects, and automobile are not considered if they are within reasonable
limits as determined by the Secretary. Id. Also excluded are:
(8) other property which, as determined in accordance with and subject to
limitations prescribed by the Secretary, is so essential to the means of self-support
of such individual (and such spouse) as to warrant its exclusion;
(4) such resources of an individual who is blind or disabled and who has a
plan for achieving self-support approved by the Secretary, as may be necessary for
the fulfillment of such plan; and
(5) in the case of Natives of Alaska, shares of stock held in a Regional or
a Village Corporation, during the period of twenty years in which such stock is
inalienable ....
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and other income. 68 These new income and resource standards are
expansive and should bring more recipients into the OAA population.69
To protect the current eligibility of recipients in states which have
more liberal income and resources limits than the Act prescribes, the
new plan provides that they shall automatically be deemed to meet
the resource test.70 However, the Senate rejected an amendment which
would have required the states to "supplement the new Federal mini-
mum assistance levels to bring them back up to the present levels."
'71
II
Is Tins RFmoim?
In attempting to analyze the effectiveness of the reforms embodied
in the new scheme, it is helpful to factor the program through a set of
criteria for comparison with existing OAA programs. 2
In determining the resources of an individual (or eligible spouse) an insurance
policy shall be taken into account only to the extent of its cash surrender value;
except that if the total face value of all life insurance policies on any person is
$1,500.00 or less, no part of the value of any such policy shall be taken into account.
Id., 86 Stat. 1470-71.
08 See notes 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
69 See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
70 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1468. This section was added pursuant to an amendment
offered by Senator Cranston. In presenting the amendment, the Senator stated:
Mhis amendment is of a basically noncontroversial nature, and would simply
"grandfather" in present eligibility and resources of those receiving aid to the aged,
blind, and disabled. This encompasses approximately 1,500 individuals whose
resources are presently within the allowable resources in their respective States,
but who would be over the maximum resource "disregard" in [the new Act].
118 CONG. R.Ec. S 17,029 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1972).
71 See 118 CONG. Rac. S 17,037 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1972). As Senator Tunney urged, this
amendment would guarantee that the "aged, blind, and disabled public assistance recip-
ients in States such as California will not be worse off after the enactment of [the Act]
than they are presently." Id. In marshalling the opposing forces, Senator Long responded:
[A]s it would stand without the Tunney amendment, if States wanted to take some
of the money they are spending on welfare payments and spend it on social services
instead of for these purposes, should they be permitted to do so?
Should they be permitted to reduce their welfare payment levels in order to
spend more on education, for example? Without the Tunney amendment, the
State would be entrusted with that decision. With the Tunney amendment, it
could not make the decision.
Id. at S 17,038.
72 Several authorities have formulated criteria which are helpful in evaluating welfare
programs. Compare Marmor, On Comparing Income Maintenance Alternatives, 65 Ams. PoL.
Sc. Rev. 83 (1971) (adequacy, stigma, equitable efficiency, incentive effects (work and
family), program costs, and political support), with Lampman, Expanding the American
System of Transfers To Do More for the Poor, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 541 (preserving incen-
tives to seek pre-allowance income, maintaining vertical and horizontal equity, paying out
1973]
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A. Adequacy
One of the most striking aspects of the new program is that the
number of eligible individuals in the aged, blind, and disabled cate-
gories will almost double.73 This is not to say that benefit levels will
necessarily increase, however.74 The new benefit level of $130 a month
($195 per couple),75 although an improvement in most states, is still
woefully inadequate. A popular standard for defining the poor is the
"poverty line." Its popularity seems to be based more on convenience
than rational analysis, however, since it too is inadequate.76 The pov-
money only or primarily to poor, avoiding incentives to family disintegration, and inte-
grating plan with existing tax and transfer system) and Musgrave, Heller & Peterson,
supra note 10 (adequacy, uniformity, work incentives, incentive to break up families, and
lack of privacy).
73 The projected number of recipients under current law for fiscal year 1973 is 3.4
million. HOUSE REPORT 227. Under the new plan that figure would jump to 6.2 million.
Id. This will be a welcome step since poverty is more prevalent among the aged than
among any other age group. In 1968, 25% of all aged persons were poor. See CoMM . FOR
ECON. DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC WELFARE SysTEM 26 (1970). This rather grim
statistic improved to 22%o in 1971. See BUREAu OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T Or COMMERCE,
CHARACTERsTics OF THE Low INCOME POPULATION: 1971, at 4 (1972).
More applicants will be covered under the Act than even the most liberal states reach
now. HousE REPORT 227-28. California will experience the least increase, going from 599,700
eligibles under current law to 608,700 under the new Act. Id. at 228.
74 See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
75 See 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1466.
76 Until 1969, the poverty index, developed by the Social Security Administration, was
based upon the Department of Agriculture's measure of the cost of a temporary, low-
budget, nutritious diet for households of various sizes. The poverty index is derived simply
by multiplying this food budget by three to reflect the fact that food typically represents
one-third of the expenses of a low-income family. PRESIDENT'S COM-Mt'N ON INCOME MAINTE-
NANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 14.
As a result of the deliberations of a federal inter-agency committee, two important
changes were instituted in 1969:
(1) that the [Social Security Administration] thresholds for nonfarm families be
retained for the base year 1963, but that annual adjustments in the levels be based
on changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rather than on changes in the cost
of food included in the economy food plan; and
(2) that the farm thresholds be raised from 70 to 85 percent of the corresponding
nonfarm levels.
BUREAU OF TuE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 73, at 17.
Writers have occasionally urged that the poverty line is too generous. See, e.g., R.
FRIEDMAN, POVERTY: DEFINITION AND PERSPECTIVE 43-45 (1965). The majority, however, sup-
port the view that the line is totally inadequate. See generally S. Jacobsen, A Proposal for
an Alternative Poverty Line, June 8, 1970 (unpublished thesis in Mann Library, Cornell
University). Jacobsen suggests that a more reasonable standard is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' lower standard budget of $5,915 for an urban family of four. Id. at 62-95. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 3 STANDARDS OF LIVING FOR AN URBAN
FAMILY OF FoUR PERSONs, Bull. No. 1570-5, at 6 (1967). In urging the application of this
standard, Jacobsen asserts that it is less arbitrary than the present line because of the
"utilization of scientific data for several components and the concept of income elasticity
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erty line for a single male over sixty-five is $1,931 in annual income. 77
The new program-which is some $40 per month more generous than
that proposed by the President78-fails even to reach this paltry figure.7 9
Aged couples fare no better; their federally guaranteed $2,340 is some
$84 per year below the poverty line.80 Although some of the states will
supplement the federal program, 81 the inescapable fact remains that
federally guaranteed benefit levels are inadequate.
B. Efficiency
To be truly efficient, a distributive program must make benefits
available to the entire target population and no one else.8 2 The new
plan contains eligibility criteria which are sufficiently stringent to
for the remainder of the budget provides an objective method of derivation." Jacobsen,
supra, at 92. However, the BLS budgets are not designed to identify the cut-off point which
separates families with enough from those with insufficient income. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra, at vii.
Another possible standard is offered by Victor R. Fuchs-that any family with an in-
come less than one-half the median family income should be classified as poor. See Fuchs,
Comment, in Six PAPERS ON THE SZE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND INCOME 198 (L. Soltow
ed. 1969). See generally Rein, Problems in the Definition and Measurement of Poverty, in
POVERTY IN AMERICA (L. Ferman ed. 1968).
77 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 73, at 18.
78 The original plan proposed by the President called for monthly benefits of $90. See
Hearings on the Family Assistance Act of 1970 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 199 (1970) (testimony of R. Finch, Secretary, HEW). The monthly
level of benefits provided for in the 1972 Act is $130. See 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1466.
79 This inadequacy is in direct contravention of the recommendation of the President's
Task Force on the Aging, which urged that all elderly citizens should be brought up to
the poverty line. PRasmcNr's TASK FORCE ON THE AGING, TOWARD A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR
mu ELmLY 24 (1970). In support of this recommendation, the Task Force asserted:
In spite of the present welfare and Social Security systems, 4.6 million older in-
dividuals had money incomes below the "poverty line" in 1968. Over two million
elderly Americans who are eligible for Old Age Assistance are at present not re-
ceiving it, and even for those who do receive it, in many States the standards for
such assistance payments are grossly inadequate.
Id.
80 The poverty line for couples is $2,424. BUREAU OF m CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CoM-
mERCE, supra note 73, at 18. For a family of four, the poverty line has risen from a base
figure of $3,128 in 1963 to $4,137 in 1971. Id. at 17. As inflation continues to push the con-
sumer price index upward, the benefits provided by the new Act will become more and
more inadequate.
81 See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra. Estimates now available indicate that
30 states and the District of Columbia would maintain a supplemental program. The re-
maining states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands would not. See HousE REPORT
212-13 (Table 4).
82 For example, the present welfare program is inefficient because it fails to reach
certain needy people-single individuals, married couples without children, and the
working poor. On the other hand, social security is an inefficient program because it dis.
tributes benefits to some who are non-needy.
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guard against payment to the non-needy, but this represents no change
from existing OAA programs. The new program, however, represents
an improvement insofar as it brings more of the target population into
the program. But it is still far from adequate unless the artificial
poverty line is accepted as realistic.
8 3
C. Potential for Litigation
A program which spawns litigation cannot be considered efficient.
Much of the litigation under the present system has involved the inter-
relationship of the states and the federal government. 4 The national-
ization of the new scheme remedies this problem, although weaknesses
in the statute continue to invite litigation. In part, this is unavoidable.
A statute would be unwieldy if it attempted to deal with every con-
ceivable source of income or type of resource. However, some spe-
cific provisions seem unnecessarily contentious. Foremost is the provision
allowing the states to impose a durational residence requirement.8 5
Although states clearly should be allowed to limit their payments to
bona fide residents, any durational requirement is probably unconstitu-
tional.8 6 The institutional inmate exception8 7 might also generate
83 See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
84 This litigation is usually based upon a conflict between the state plan and the
Social Security Act. In that sense the litigation usually, but not always, arises from the
conformity hearing. See generally 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1850, at 1860 (1972).
85 1972 Act § 301, 86 Stat. 1474; see note 23 supra.
86 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); note 23 supra. The exact bound-
aries of Shapiro are not dear, but it has been relied upon to strike down a presumption
that an applicant who was not a resident for more than one year had moved into the
state for the purpose of obtaining benefits and was therefore ineligible. See Gaddis v.
Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971), the
Supreme Court held, per curiam, that whether a welfare program is or is not federally
funded is irrelevant to the constitutional principles enunciated in Shapiro. Thus, a state
may not rely upon the argument that since a program is state-funded the state may im-
pose whatever criteria it desires. Former HEW Secretary Richardson took the view that
state durational residency requirements are unconstitutional:
We think that the Supreme Court decision on this point makes unconstitu-
tional the provision of H.R. 1 which seeks to permit States to apply residency
requirements with respect to eligibility for the State supplement.
Hearings, supra note 19, at 112.
Conceivably, a subdivision of a state might try to impose a residency requirement
for applicants for a supplementary program. This might be constitutionally defensible on
the basis that Shapiro spoke only to the right of interstate travel. However, it would
seem that the right to travel interstate could include the right to travel intrastate. Thus,
any proposed durational residence requirement, insofar as it served as a prerequisite to
eligibility for county general assistance benefits, could impede the right to travel intra-
state. See COLO. Ar'Y GEN. Op. No. 70-4521 (1970). But see Town of Vanden Broeck v.
Reitz, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971).
87 See note 38 supra.
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equal protection attacks.8 8 The provision that the Secretary may es-
tablish a maximum value for an applicant's house is also arbitrary and
susceptible to attack. Regardless of what figure the Secretary chooses,
there may be needy applicants excluded by his classification.8 9 Finally,
the presumption that a spouse's income will be imputed to the appli-
cant could be subject to challenge, particularly since the provision ap-
plies to those who do not have a support obligation under state law.90
88 This eligibility exclusion will certainly ease administrative burdens, but its sup-
porting rationale is appropriate only with respect to those recipients who are not ex-
pected to leave such an institution. The rationale that the institution fulfills the
applicant's every need ignores the fact that the recipient might well have outside ex-
penses, such as rent or taxes, which are continuing obligations. Furthermore, if the
recipient has an eligible spouse, the spouse-at least until the recipient has been institu-
tionalized for more than six months-will only be entitled to one-half of the reduced
couples benefit of $195. As an eligible individual, the spouse would be entitled to $180.
See 1972 Act § 801, 86 Stat. 1478.
89 For example, suppose that the Secretary establishes a maximum value of $15,000.
Applicant A has a house assessed at $14,500. He is therefore "eligible" and has the op-
portunity to have his application factored through the needs formula. Furthermore, the
value of his house will be disregarded under the resource disregard. Id., 86 Stat. 1470.
Applicant B has a house assessed at $15,500. He would not be entitled to the resource
disregard since he is over the limit established by the Secretary. Furthermore, he is ex-
cluded from even applying because of the $1,500 resource limitation. Id., 86 Stat. 1466.
This would be the result even if B had no income or other resource and A were earning
$3,000 per year. See notes 91-92 and accompanying text infra. This inequity could be
avoided if the Secretary were to establish an exorbitant limit-say $100,000. A more sensi-
ble system would be to factor each applicant through the needs formula.
90 The presence of a support obligation has been deemed crucial by the Supreme
Court in the AFDC area. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 809 (1968), the Court invalidated
Alabama's so-called "substitute father" regulation, which denied AFDC payments to a
mother who cohabited with any single or married able-bodied man. The Court held that
when Congress specified "parent," it meant one who had a duty of support. Subsequently,
the Court had to determine the validity of a California regulation which presumed the
needs of the family to be reduced by virtue of a man's presence in the home. See Lewis
v. Martin, 897 U.S. 552 (1970), rev'g Lewis v. Stark, 812 F. Supp. 197 (N.D. Cal. 1968). In
striking down the regulation, the Court relied on an HEW regulation which provided, in
part, that "only income and resources that are, in fact, available to an applicant or re-
cipient for current use on a regular basis will be taken into consideration in determining
need and the amount of payment." 897 U.S. at 555. The current regulations provide:
"[O]nly such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will
be considered, and only currently available resources will be considered." 45 C.F.R.
§ 283.20(a)(8)(ii)(c) (1972). See also Solman v. Shapiro, 800 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn.), aff'd
per curiam, 896 U.S. 5 (1969).
These cases were decided upon statutory grounds, however. Consequently, if one
wanted to attack the presumption created by the new law, he would have to formulate
a constitutional argument. In the Lewis case, the plaintiff alleged violation of both the
due process and equal protection guarantees. 312 F. Supp. at 199. The lower court dis-
missed these arguments, and the propriety of that disposition was not resolved on ap-
peal since the constitutional issue was not reached. Thus, a constitutional argument does
not appear to be foreclosed.
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D. Work Incentives
The new Act's provisions with respect to income exclusions have a
built-in work incentive. In determining the applicant's income, the ad-
ministrative agency must disregard $20 of social security or other in-
come plus $65 of earned income per month. One-half of any earned
income in excess of $65 will also be disregarded. 91 Applying this for-
mula, a recipient could earn up to a total of $3,900 and receive up to
$240 in social security payments before dropping out of the program.
Unearned income is not entitled to this disregard. Consequently, fami-
lies with the same incomes could receive different benefits on the
basis of the source of their income. This differential is justified on the
ground that it enhances the work incentive by giving earned income a
preferred status.92 The purpose of this kind of incentive is to enable
"those aged, blind, and disabled individuals who are able to do some
work to do so and in the process give them a higher income in ad-
dition to supplemental security income."93 However, since the over-
whelming majority of the recipients in this category are unemploy-
able,94 the work incentive serves a limited purpose.
E. Personal Costs
In evaluating the overall desirability of a given welfare program,
it is important to examine the extent to which the program requires
91 1972 Act § S01, 86 Stat. 1469-70; see note 67 and accompanying text supra. Orig-
inally, this provision did not apply to the aged. The difference was justified on the
grounds that the blind and the disabled needed added encouragement to enter rehabili-
tative programs or to accept employment. Fortunately, Congress realized that many aged
desire to keep working and that denial of the income disregard would be unfair to them.
See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INsTmnrE FOR PUBLIC POLICY R.sEARcH, supra note 1, at 46.
92 Another justification might be that by reducing payments to those with unearned
income, more money becomes available to those in greater need. See Ass'N OF THE BAR
oF THE CiTY OF NEW YORK, JoiNT SuBcomm. ON WELFARE PROPOSALS, REPORT ON WELFARE
PRoposALs 14-15 (1970) (urging abolition of distinction on basis that it was inconsistent
with program's basic purposes). Furthermore, this distinction discourages relatives and
friends from making gifts to recipients.
98 118 CONG. REc. S 18,486 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972) (summary of conference action
on the Act). It is interesting that the Act contains a work incentive for the elderly, par-
ticularly since the Social Security program contains a retirement test designed to dis-
courage the elderly from working. See 42 U.S.C. § 411 (1970). The 1972 Act liberalized
that test by increasing the earnings limitation from $1,680 to $2,100. For earnings in
excess of that amount, $1 in social security benefits will be withheld for each $4 of earn-
ings. 1972 Act § 105(a), 86 Stat. 1341. An amendment was added to H.R. 1 which would
have required the Secretary of HEW to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of
eliminating or extensively revising the earnings test. This amendment was stricken by the
conference committee. See CONF. REP. No. 92-1605, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972).
94 In 1964, only 28% of men aged 65 and over were in the labor force. Neiman,
supra note 52, at 13. Forty percent of the aged are physically unable to carry on their
major activity. Id.
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the sacrifice of certain personal rights.95 Personal cost is made up of at
least three elements: stigma, loss of privacy, and incentive for family
disintegration.
1. Stigma
Many critics of the current welfare system claim that "the means
test degrades and humiliates recipients and that administrative prac-
tices perpetuate feelings of shame." '96 The problem may also be
viewed in terms of alienation and loss of self-respect.97 If the needs
test is retained, some stigma could be avoided by using the applicant-
declaration method of eligibility determination rather than the case-
worker-investigation method.98 Since the new Act retains the needs test
and makes no provision for more equitable administration, it repre-
sents no improvement in this area.
2. Loss of Privacy
The needs test is also onerous because it involves governmental in-
trusion into the applicant's family and personal affairs. Many commen-
tators feel that extensive inquiries, insofar as they are conducted to
root out "chiselers," are unnecessary. 9 Although some recent decisions
95 In the present system these personal costs are occasionally so high that many
eligibles reject assistance. See Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax
PracticaL, 77 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1967).
96 Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare Re-
cipients, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969). The authors report the findings of a survey taken
in an attempt to ascertain recipients' attitudes. According to indicators of embarrassment
and community hostility, more than one-half of the recipients surveyed had at least
some feelings of stigma. Id. at 5. The authors make the perceptive point that those who
feel stigmatized are usually the activists who are "more likely to join welfare rights or-
ganizations or to seek out lawyers or other people with access to power, such as community
organizers, when they have complaints against welfare." Id. at 18. Those who felt no
stigma seemed to be passive and accepting. Id. at 19.
97 In some countries the poor have been able to maintain their self-respect, but in
America, "[v]ery many of the poor, for their own part, view the rest of us with resent-
ment or themselves with contempt." A. ScHoRu, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PoLucY 264
(1968).
98 As of July 1, 1971, the states were required to implement a simplified method for
determining eligibility for OAA. 45 C.F.R. § 205.20(a)(2)(ii) (1972). This simplified method
adopts the applicant-declaration principle, subject to further investigation when the ap-
plicant's statement is incomplete, unclear, or inconsistent. Id. § 205.20(a)(3). See REPORT
ON WELFARE PRoPosALs, supra note 92, at 24-25. See also CoMM. FOR ECON. DEVELOpmNT,
supra note 73, at 21:
Present methods of certification and payment are particularly onerous, need-
less, and wasteful where the aged, blind, and disabled are concerned. We rec-
ommend that the administration of the assistance programs for the aged, blind,
and disabled be handled within the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare by federal payments in a manner similar to that used for Social Security
payments.
99 The long-established eligibility determination process is increasingly recog-
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have limited the scope and manner of the administrative inquiry,1°0
questionable techniques'' remain in operation, and the new Act does
not preclude them.
3. Incentive for Family Disintegration
Although this aspect of personal costs is usually discussed in con-
junction with the AFDC program, it is applicable to the OAA pro-
gram as well. The new Act provides for a lower total benefit to a
couple than to two individuals. However, the apparent incentive for
divorce, or perhaps even for common law marriage, is offset by two
factors. First, the Act provides that as long as a couple remain living
together they will be considered a couple.10 2 Second, the lower benefit
level for couples is a deliberate attempt to factor economies of scale
nized as an anachronism. It is unduly time-consuming and administratively costly
to the agency, as well as being frustrating and humiliating to the applicant.
There is no evidence that persons dependent on public support are any less
honest than other citizens. Complicated fraud investigations reveal no more, if
as many, efforts at deception than are found in income tax returns or in the
fraudulent practices such as shoplifting as experienced by the business world.
NATIONAL STUDY SERvIcE, supra note 9, at 3.
100 For example, in Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 396 US. 488 (1970), the district court held that Connecticut could not terminate
a mother's AFDC payments for refusal to identify the father of her child. The relevant
section in the federal statute requires that a state must provide
for the development and implementation of a program under which the State
agency will undertake . . . in the case of a child born out of wedlock who is re-
ceiving aid .... to establish the paternity of such child and secure support for
him.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1970). Through tortured statutory analysis, the court was able to
side-step § 602(a)(17) and to base its decision on the statute without reaching the con-
stitutional issues involved. A more reasonable approach would have been to rest the de-
cision on constitutional grounds. There are three potential arguments raised by the
case: the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination, equal protection, and
invasion of privacy rights protected under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101 One of the most odious techniques used is the home visit. In Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Court upheld the home visit procedure, saying that the home
visit was not a search and that even if it were it would not be unreasonable. Wyman
should not be construed as a license to permit all types of home visits, however. In
Wyman the visit was prearranged and there was some pretext of counseling. A surprise
visit designed to catch and punish the unwary recipient should mandate a different re-
sult.
Another administrative technique which tends to erode the applicant's self-respect
is the use of collateral contacts and neighborhood investigations to verify eligibility. In-
discriminate use of collateral contacts has three major disadvantages: the information re-
ceived is not always reliable, a "climate of suspicion" is created in the neighborhood, and
the procedure perpetuates the "badging of the poor." See Comment, Eligibility Deter-
minations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsyl-
vania, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 1307, 1328-33 (1967).
102 See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
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into the Act. Thus, two singles are no better off than a couple with a
lower total would be.
103
F. Financial Costs
The estimated total to be spent on various existing OAA, AB,
and APTD programs in fiscal year 1973 is $3,614.2 million.10 4 Under
the new program this would increase to $5,656.2 million.1 5 The most
significant change, however, would be in the relationship between
state and federal spending. Under the existing program, federal ex-
penditures would amount to $2,177.6 million; state expenditures would
total $1,436.6 million. Under the new plan, the federal payments
would almost double-to $4,137.3 million-although the anticipated
state participation would rise only slightly-to $1,518.9 million. 06
Thus, the expected change in estimated federal and nonfederal costs
for fiscal year 1973 would amount to an increase in federal spending
of $1,959.8 million, and an increase in state expenditures of $82.3 mil-
lion.107
CONCLUSION
The new federal program for income supplementation of the
elderly, blind, and disabled marks a significant welfare reform in this
country. The most significant improvement is that there will be a
single national welfare program with federally guaranteed minimum
standards and benefits. The primary limitation is that the guarantees
offered by the program are inadequate. With state supplementation,
however, realistic benefit levels may be reached in some states.
Richard C. White
103 HousE REPORT 150. However, two individuals of the same sex sharing an apart-
ment would be eligible for the full benefit.
104 Id. at 210-11 (Table 3).
105 Id. at 212-13 (Table 4).
106 Id.
107 See id. at 214-15 (Table 5).
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